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The sustainability of private obstetric care will soon 
be under threat. Claims inflation leads to increasing 
indemnity costs, which means that private obstetric 
in demnity cover will probably be unaffordable by 
the end of the decade. This not only has serious consequences for 
private obstetricians and private parturients of the future, but there 
are also serious public health sequelae. As obstetrics is the vanguard 
of the threat we are concentrating on private[1] obstetrics, but private 
neurosurgery and spinal surgery face similar imminent threats.[1]
Invariably there is an unhappy story behind every case of litiga­
tion involving obstetric care where a child has been compromised. 
As these children now often survive, and then live longer as a 
result of sophisticated expensive care, obstetric claims are inevitably 
extremely high value and run into millions of rands. While an indi­
vidual obstetrician may be at relatively low risk of having a claim of 
the magnitude of an obstetric claim, the claim’s value can be so high 
that a single individual could not afford to compensate a deserving 
claimant. The financial risk has to be transferred to an insurer or 
shared by a not­for­profit indemnifier.
Those accepting the financial risk of obstetric claims require 
sufficient reserves to meet future administrative and claims costs. 
Insurers are already avoiding the market and, as a result of claims 
inflation, not­for­profit indemnifiers are becoming progressively 
unaffordable as their subscription rates reflect actuarially calcu­
lated obstetric risk. Based on the claims inflation and subsequent 
subscription inflation, there are concerns that indemnity for obstetric 
risk will be unaffordable by the end of the decade.[2]
Obstetricians who are not indemnified would be poorly advised 
to continue practising obstetrics. A single case would leave them 
financially ruined, and a deserving patient would be inadequately 
compensated. Additionally they may be precluded from practising by 
regulation or by the private hospital where they deliver – it is unlikely 
that private hospital groups would knowingly allow an obstetrician 
who is not indemnified to deliver at their facility.
Patients will continue to fall pregnant and require delivery. If they 
cannot deliver in private facilities, they will have to deliver in state 
facilities. This will increase the workload of already heavily burdened 
state facilities by an additional 10% nationally, but inevitably more 
in the urban areas where private patients tend to reside, which 
already act as referral centres for rural state patients. Not only 
will the increased workload shift across to state facilities, but the 
obstetric liability will move from private care to the state. Already 
overburdened facilities will have to cope with patients who expect 
private healthcare and the system will be placed under even more 
stress – probably increasing the litigation burden on the state.[3]
Who are the potential losers here? Private patients are unlikely to 
be endeared by the prospect of delivering in state facilities. Private 
obstetricians’ income may fall. Already busy state facilities will be placed 
under increased strain, and this burden will be disproportionately 
placed on units that already accept referrals from urban areas. State 
patients will be inconvenienced; their labour wards will become busier 
with an influx of demanding patients. There is likely to be an increased 
litigation burden that will further disadvantage state patients, as 
the state does not budget independently for litigation and every 
rand spent out of the health budget is a rand no longer available for 
healthcare or to improve facilities. Private patients, private providers, 
public patients, public providers, policymakers and politicians all have 
a vested interest in resolving the problem.
Medical approaches
The intuitive response from the medical profession is to blame and 
vilify lawyers. Lawyers will rightfully argue that obstetricians are 
responsible for the predicament in which they find themselves. There 
is either a problem with the care offered by individual obstetricians, or 
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there is a problem with the system rendering 
the care. In reality, a relatively small number 
of repeated errors lead to most preventable 
adverse outcomes.
The model of private intrapartum obstetric 
care delivery has been described previously 
and consists of remote obstetricians reliant 
upon the expertise of labour ward staff of 
varying qualification and quality.[1] While 
the obstetrician is ultimately responsible for 
the patient, the obstetrician being remote 
precludes the model from being considered a 
consultant­led service as described by the Royal 
College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists 
(RCOG). Although midwives may be pri­
marily responsible for the labouring patient’s 
admission and first­stage care, the model is also 
not that of a midwife obstetric unit.
The system is vulnerable; medical involve­
ment is remote, nursing care is of varying 
qualification and quality, and there is no 
uniformity of process.[4]
Liability is complicated by the fact that 
obstetricians are independently indemni­
fied while the employer of the labour ward 
staff is vicariously liable for their acts or 
omissions. Indeed, the high caesarean section 
rate, justified as a response to increasing 
litigation, is perhaps an acknowledgement 
of the frailties of the current system.
The English system as advocated by the 
RCOG, using both qualified midwives and 
doctors, including consultants, in the labour 
ward, will be well understood by virtually all 
medical and nursing staff. It is the system 
that is utilised, to a greater or lesser extent, in 
the training of undergraduate and postgra­
duate medical and midwifery personnel 
in South Africa (SA). Regulatory changes 
and an appetite by private hospital groups 
to adopt the model would be necessary 
to implement any system compatible with 
RCOG recommendations.[5] Labour ward 
doctors, including obstetricians, would no 
longer be independent contractors but 
private hospital employees. Understandably 
this approach may not be appealing to many 
obstetricians currently in private practice.[6]
An approach utilised by the largest private 
obstetric healthcare provider in America may 
be more applicable to private practice in SA. 
The Hospital Corporation of America does 
not employ doctors and may be the most 
appealing approach both to SA obstetricians 
and SA private hospital groups. Since the 
inception of the programme there has been an 
improvement in outcomes, a dramatic decline 
in litigation claims, and a reduction in the 
primary caesarean section rate. Importantly 
the approach has been amenable to expansion 
beyond the initial pilot and sustainable. 
Claims frequency continues to fall despite an 
increasing claims frequency nationally.[7]
The basic principles and subsequent addi­
tions are set out in Table 1. The approach utilises 
well­described risk management tools.[8] When 
confronted with so many interventions, it is 
difficult to identify the interventions most 
likely to have made a significant difference. 
It is interesting to note that a relatively small 
number of repeated errors lead to most 
preventable adverse outcomes. Uniformity 
of process and clearly defined unambiguous 
practice guidelines would assist in decreasing 
the number of repeated errors.[9]
Perhaps two points are particularly salient. 
Firstly, if the current care system cannot do the 
job, then trying harder will not make it work; 
changing the system of care will. Secondly, 
the changes could not be coerced and were 
dependent upon pure leadership.[10] An 
organisation, perhaps either private hospital 
groups or the South African Society of 
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (SASOG), 
would to have to take the leadership role.[11]
While changes to the medical system may 
alleviate the problem, these changes would 
take a considerable time to implement and 
it would be even longer before the benefits 
would be such that they would influence 
subscription rates. Even the American model 
considers the possibility of 24­hour labour 
ward obstetricians. One very quick solution 
would be for the private hospital groups to 
employ obstetricians and implement either 
another or the English or American models 
described.[12] As employers the hospital 
groups would be vicariously liable for the 
acts or omissions of their employees  – 
the obstetricians. Instead of transferring 
obstetric liability to the state, it could be 
transferred to the private hospital groups.
Legal approaches
The medicolegal framework
Any legal assessment of the posed title of 
this article should be approached with refer­
ence to the guiding medicolegal framework 
consisting of the supreme Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa,[13] the common 
law, the applicable healthcare legislation, and 
consideration of applicable medical ethics.[14] 
Any solution to the posed title, viewed from 
a legal standpoint, will have to resonate in 
the legal framework in the context of legal 
compliance. It is also evident that complex 
health problems (as the present topic under 
discussion) have remained largely unsolved 
in the 21st century and are indicative of 
conflicts between public interests and 
individual rights as part of evolving health 
crises in many countries (including SA). 
The regulation of healthcare practitioners, 
the determination of liability for clinical 
negligence and the issue of funding and 
costs pose specific challenges. It is to be 
noted that without adequate funding there 
can be no access to justice for the victims 
of clinical medical negligence. Funding and 
costs (inclusive of compensation) go hand­
in­hand as together they determine the 
Table 1
Principles and additional points of the redesigned system
• Uniform process and procedure.
• Every member of the obstetric team should be required to halt any process that is deemed to 
be dangerous.
• Caesarean delivery is best viewed as a process alternative, not a source of outcome or a quality 
endpoint.
• Malpractice is best avoided by reduction in adverse outcomes and the development of 
unambiguous practice guidelines.
• Effective peer review is essential to quality medical practice.
• Expansion of online provider education/communication programme.
• Ongoing process standardisation.
• Development of national quality metrics.
• Elective early term delivery.
• Prevention of post caesarean venous thromboembolism.
• Perinatal/neonatal collaboration.
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bigger picture – namely the financial context in which the specialist 
physician operates. This economic reality should also underpin 
the patient’s or health user’s right to healthcare in an integrated 
and accessible health system.[15] Interpreted as equal access to 
necessary healthcare facilities (private or public), the notion of 
access to care (in context, and including reproductive healthcare) 
raises various fundamental questions within the obstetrician­patient 
relationship. Clearly access to healthcare includes the absence of 
unjust discrimination in the rendering of obstetric care and begs 
the question of whether funding and costs (or capping or absence 
thereof ) will negatively impact on the level, quality and availability 
of obstetric services a patient would constitutionally and ethically be 
entitled to. Access to healthcare (reproductive healthcare) is therefore 
dependent on the quality assurance of obstetric care as amplified by 
proper funding and costs in cases where damages are claimed based 
on clinical obstetric negligence.
The present nature of damages and 
compensation in SA law: Liability and 
compensation based on fault
In terms of the Law of Obligations (contract and delict), the same medi­
cal negligence may constitute both a breach of contract and delict. 
Liability for medical negligence is firmly rooted in a system based on 
fault. Therefore a plaintiff­patient may rely on the breach of contract or 
alternatively on delict. Only pecuniary damages (patrimonial damages) 
may be recovered in contract, while pecuniary and non­pecuniary 
(non­patrimonial) damages may be recovered in delict. Recoverable 
pecuniary damages include medical costs (past as well as future), loss 
of income (past and future earnings), maintenance, etc. The ambit for 
recoverable non­pecuniary damages includes not only compensation 
for actual physical pain, but also shock, discomfort and mental 
suffering, disfigurement, loss of amenities of life and disability, and loss 
of expectation of life – called loss ‘for pain and suffering’.[16,17] It is also 
possible to claim for detectable psychiatric injury, provided that there 
was actual psychological injury caused by medical negligence and the 
psychological harm is significant.[18­20] The calculation of non­pecuniary 
damages is more often than not complex and controversial, and in this 
regard the courts are, in principle, guided by policy considerations and 
comparable precedent.[21,22] Provision is also made in the Apportionment 
of Damages Act[23] for instances of contributory negligence. In addition, 
SA law makes provision for a so­called ‘contingency fee’ conditionally 
allowed since 1999 in terms of the Contingency Fees Act.[24] Pivotal, 
however, is the rule which serves as the most powerful deterrent against 
medical negligence litigation, namely that the patient­plaintiff runs the 
risk that an order of costs will be made against him/her if the case fails. It 
is also to be noted that punitive damages (as known in the USA) are not 
awarded in cases of medical negligence in SA.[25] In addition, the advent 
of the Consumer Protection Act[26] (in the context of healthcare services) 
has also contributed to patients (as consumers) asserting their rights to 
compensation in an already litigious society, specifically in the context 
of obstetric negligence.[27,28]
Alternative options to the present system, based 
on fault
Various options in response to systems, based on fault, have been 
postulated (inclusive of dispute resolution, the establishment of special 
medical negligence courts, adjudication by way of expert screening 
panels, mediation,[29] periodical or staggered pay­outs[30] and defensive 
professional training).[31­33] In an attempt to curtail the meteoric rise 
in legal and insurance costs emanating from medical negligence 
litigation, it is specifically the implementation of a substantive no­
fault system and/or the statutory capping of compensation that have 
received considerable attention in some countries.[34] In addition, 
there is the radical option for government subsidisation by way of 
the establishment of a state excess insurance fund thereby providing 
victims of medical negligence a quid pro quo for the potential loss of 
complete compensation.[30] The focus of the discussion here will be on 
the no­fault system and the capping of damages as possible sustainable 
or substantive options for obstetric negligence in SA.
The no-fault option
Medical no­fault schemes (where provision is made for compen­
sation for medical and other injuries independently of liability) were 
first introduced from the 1970s in the Nordic countries (Sweden 
1975, Finland 1984, Norway 1988 and Denmark 1992) and as part 
of the comprehensive accident compensation scheme introduced 
in 1974 in New Zealand.[30,35,34] Birth injury no­fault compensation 
schemes were established in the 1980s in the US states of Florida and 
Virginia.[36,37] No­fault legislation was introduced in Austria in 2001 
and a no­fault component was included in the new medical injury 
scheme in France in 2002, while Belgium followed suit in 2007 and 
Poland in 2011 (under the influence of the Swedish scheme). In Japan 
a new scheme was introduced in 2009 to deal with obstetric injury 
involving severe brain damage. An obstetric injury scheme, similar 
to  that in Japan, was recommend for England and Wales in 2003, but 
was not carried through to the subsequent legislation.[37] 
The main arguments for no­fault compensation are considerations 
of fairness; speedier resolution of cases; lower administrative 
and legal costs than court action; the increased certainty for 
complainants on the circumstances in which compensation 
is payable and increased consistency between claimants; the 
reduced tension between clinicians and claimants; and the greater 
willingness by clinicians to report errors and adverse events.[38] 
Critics of no­fault compensation argue that overall costs will be 
higher than under a tort system; that it will open the floodgates 
to compensation payments and fuel a compensation culture; 
that disputes about causation remain, even if fault is removed; 
that disputes about the amount of damages remain, unless there 
is a tariff­based approach; that it is difficult to distinguish injury 
from the natural progression of the disease in some cases; that 
explanations and apologies are not necessarily provided in a system 
that focuses on financial recompense alone; and that a no­fault 
system, in itself, does not improve accountability or ensure learning 
from adverse effects.[38] However, Ken Oliphant, former director of 
the European Centre of Tort and Insurance Law in Vienna, Austria, 
correctly states that it seems that no­fault liability schemes are back 
on the reform agenda internationally, even if only a limited number 
of countries have actually implemented such schemes.[38,34]
The capping option
Proponents of damages caps have argued that damages caps benefit 
consumers by reducing the rate of increase in health insurance.[39] 
Ultimately the question to be posed is whether victims of medical 
negligence are sufficiently compensated for the smaller amount of 
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expected damages by a reduction in the cost of healthcare. Research 
indicates that damages caps are the most controversial aspect of 
medical negligence reform.[39] Central to the debate, emanating 
mostly from the USA, is the constitutionality of damages caps as 
policymakers expect liability insurers to give effect to the passage 
of caps by reducing premiums in response to their improved risk 
exposure and ability to predict their payouts.[39]
The research of authors Kelly and Mello [40] indicates that in the USA 
there have been five major constitutional grounds for challenging 
medical liability for reform: 
• Damages caps have been challenged using the open­courts 
guarantee contained in many state constitutions. 
• Damages caps have been said to violate the right to trial by jury.
• Damages caps have been perceived to violate both federal and 
state equal protection guarantees. 
• Damages caps have been challenged using due process provision 
in federal and state laws. 
• Damages caps are occasionally challenged in terms of the doctrine 
of the separation of powers.[30] 
It is specifically in the context of non­economic damages that 
legislative caps were introduced in a number of states in the USA 
(ranging from a total cap of a minimum of $250 000 to a maximum of 
$500 000, with courts in some states having the authority to increase 
the maximum cap to $1 million).[40] 
Although the constitutionality of damages caps in the USA has been 
successfully challenged in a minority of states,[41­43] comprehensive 
research[39] indicates that this issue has now largely been resolved 
in the sense that rigorous empirical analyses conducted since 1990 
found that malpractice premiums, in principle, are lower in the 
presence of damages caps. However, the effects of damages caps on 
the practice of defensive medicine, the subsequent increase in the 
availability of doctors in certain locations and the cost of healthcare 
to consumers are less clear. Some researchers state that the evidence 
about damages caps’ effectiveness remains mixed and concerns 
about their equity implications persist.[40,44]
The possible introduction of damages caps for medical 
negligence (in the context of private obstetric negligence) in SA 
will undoubtedly, by analogy to the experience in the USA, also face 
constitutional challenges, specifically with reference to the equality 
clause,[45] access to courts provisions,[46] and the doctrine of the 
separation of powers.[47] Taking the cue from the salient American 
law it may be stated that, traditionally, in terms of equal protection 
clause challenges, experience has taught that challenges in this 
regard arise as a result of so­called differential treatment of plaintiffs 
in medical negligence cases. The differentiation translates into pitting 
plaintiffs in a medical negligence action against plaintiffs in other 
personal injury cases (who can obtain full recovery) – in the words of 
author Gfell: ‘the equal protection argument against damages caps 
becomes fairly obvious: those who suffer the most severe injuries 
will go without full compensation for their non­economic damages, 
while those who suffer relatively minor injuries from other personal 
injury will be entitled to full recovery of non­economic damages’.[30] 
It is, however, to be noted that mere unequal treatment in terms of 
legislation is not per se unconstitutional. This will also be the case if 
section 36 (the limitation clause) of the SA Constitution is invoked 
and such limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society.[47] In terms of the access­to­courts provision in 
our Constitution (militating against a system of damages caps), it 
is trite law that all victims of medical negligence should have the 
right to have justifiable disputes settled by a court of law or, where 
appropriate, by another independent and impartial forum.[47,48]
Conclusion
In our view, private obstetric care can be saved in SA – it remains a 
matter of affordability. It is to be noted that the issue is not about the 
merits of the medical negligence case (which will be served well by 
the current applicable substantive medical law), but rather about the 
quantum of damages, and more in particular non­economic damages 
to be awarded for obstetric negligence. One solution, in our opinion, 
from a medical approach, points to the importation of the English 
system advocated by the RCOG as discussed above.
From a legal approach, it is submitted that the only viable and 
substantive options, as indicated from international perspectives, 
are the establishment of a no­fault compensation system, or the 
introduction of a system of damages caps for non­economic damages 
only – both systems, as discussed, offer distinct advantages and 
disadvantages. The most recent comparative research pertaining 
to no­fault systems indicate that if no­fault is to displace liability 
systems based on fault, this should be accompanied by additional 
mechanisms to ensure the goals of prevention and accountability. 
To date there is insufficient evidence to assess whether the steps 
taken in jurisdictions where no­fault systems were introduced (e.g. 
New Zealand and the Scandinavian countries) have been effective, 
specifically with regard to the promotion of patient safety. On the 
other hand, however, there is no clear evidence that the substitution 
of a liability system with a no­fault system has had a detrimental 
effect on patient safety.[48]  
In the context of the question posed in this article, however, 
the economic realities and the unprecedented rise in obstetric 
negligence in SA, a considered system of damages caps for non­
economic damages (non­patrimonial damages) only, seems to 
be the more appropriate and legally the less invasive option. The 
adoption of such a limited system will still ensure access to the courts 
in terms of the substantive merits of the law pertaining to the case, 
but will undoubtedly curtail the quantum proceedings. In addition, 
this option may be further enhanced by government subsidisation 
by way of the establishment of a state excess insurance fund (or 
‘top­up’ fund) which could cover any shortfall in compensation in 
deserving cases of obstetric negligence. It goes without saying that 
the introduction of a system of damages caps will have to withstand 
constitutional muster.
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